Simulating terrorism: Credible commitment, costly signaling, and strategic behavior


Journal article


David A Siegel, Joseph K Young
PS: Political Science & Politics, vol. 42, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 765-771

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APA
Siegel, D. A., & Young, J. K. (2009). Simulating terrorism: Credible commitment, costly signaling, and strategic behavior. PS: Political Science & Politics, 42, 765–771.

Chicago/Turabian
Siegel, David A, and Joseph K Young. “Simulating Terrorism: Credible Commitment, Costly Signaling, and Strategic Behavior.” PS: Political Science & Politics 42 (2009): 765–771.

MLA
Siegel, David A., and Joseph K. Young. “Simulating Terrorism: Credible Commitment, Costly Signaling, and Strategic Behavior.” PS: Political Science & Politics, vol. 42, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 765–71.


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